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After the Goldrush:  
Industrial Re-configuration in the UK Television Production Sector and Content 
 
Introduction 
At a time when the television industry is undergoing sweeping changes, this article 
examines recent restructurings in ownership particularly affecting the production sector.  
Technological and market changes in the television industry appear to have transformed 
the corporate configurations which conduce to economic success in the programme-
making sector.  As a result, many leading independent television production companies in 
the UK and elsewhere across Europe have become prime targets for corporate activity 
and many have been subject to takeover, often by US media groups.  Does this matter? 
Does the concept of ‘national’ television content still have any relevance in the digital 
era?   Drawing on a multiple case study-based analysis of several UK-based television 
production companies over recent years, this article examines how corporate takeovers 
and differing sorts of ownership configurations in the production sector may affect 
creative decision-making and impact on the nature and quality of television content. 
This article focuses on UK production in an increasingly globalised industrial context.  
The success of television production in the UK in transforming itself from a cottage 
industry back in the 1990s to a sector that is now seen as ‘punching above its weight’ in 
terms of international sales of finished programmes and formats (McVay, cited in PACT 
2017) has been widely lauded.   In part, this success reflects transformations affecting the 
television industry as a whole with growth in digital distribution fuelling a proliferation 
in channels, outlets and platforms for television content, including rapidly-growing SVoD 
(subscription video on demand) services which, in turn, have increased international 
demand for attractive content.   The ability of UK producers to capitalize on 
technological and market changes also, in part, reflects a history of public policy 
interventions that is unique to the UK (Lee, 2018; Potter, 2008).   
The impetus to establish and sustain a television sector that is independent1 – i.e. one 
which is separate from broadcasting – can be traced back to the Annan Report of 1977 
and was acted upon through such interventions as the setting up of Channel 4 as a 
‘publisher-broadcaster’ in 1982 and the introduction, via the 1990 Broadcasting Act, of a 
25% compulsory access quota for ‘indies’ on the BBC and on commercial rival ITV 
(Doyle and Paterson, 2008).  This facilitated the emergence of a flourishing sector but 
one which was comprised almost entirely of small creative enterprises. While consistent 
with facilitating diversity, a fragmented industry structure was seen as holding back 
production companies from developing their businesses and properly managing and 
exploiting their intellectual property assets (Darlow, 2004).   This situation was 
recognized and addressed via the 2003 Communications Act which required UK 
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regulator Ofcom to oversee new ‘terms of trade’ in commissioning negotiations between 
public service broadcasters and independent producers (Doyle and Paterson, 2008).  The 
terms of trade intervention has been highly effective in enabling UK ‘indies’ to retain a 
greater share of ownership in the (IPRs) rights to their productions thus greatly improving 
their business performance.  Other initiatives to encourage the development of 
independent production across the UK have included, for example, support for regional 
and minority programming and, more recently, tax incentives for high-end drama 
productions (Doyle and Paterson, 2008, Paterson, 2017). 
But growth and commercial success in the production sector have, in turn, triggered a 
number of takeovers of many of the UK’s leading independent producers from 2004 
onwards, often by US media conglomerates (Chalaby, 2010; Campelli, 2015; Lee, 2018).  
A restructuring in ownership, characterized by increasing consolidation, vertical cross-
ownership and the growing controlling presence of non-domestic parent groups has 
raised questions about how these changes impact on the production of national television 
content.  
Recent work in media and cultural theory has emphasized the challenges posed by the 
ongoing effects of globalization on flows of cultural content for such notions as state 
sovereignty and ‘national’ culture (Giddens, 2003; Kuipers, 2012; Thussu, 2007).  Even 
so, critical press coverage surrounding takeovers of independent producers points to 
enduring public concerns about the effects of differing forms of custodianship of 
businesses that involve creation of cultural outputs.  Many sociologists, political 
scientists and political economists (Bagdikian, 2014; Curran and Seaton, 2009; 
Freedman, 2008; Harvey, 2015) have raised concern about the effects of differing forms 
of corporate ownership on media content.  Earlier theorisation points to a strongly 
assumed association between corporate ownership and content (Doyle, 2002; Garnham, 
1990; McChesney, 2008; Tunstall and Palmer, 1991).  However, little earlier research has 
been conducted which tests this association empirically. 
Some critics have been vocative in denouncing the effects on creativity and on content of 
waves of consolidation and takeovers of UK indies by foreign multinationals (Abraham, 
2014).  In television as in other sectors of the creative industries such as music, notions of 
both independence and indigeneity are generally regarded as important because of the 
perceived role of independent producers in facilitating diversity of output, including 
locally made output, and in democratisation of access for marginal voices (Bennett and 
Strange, 2014).  However, as earlier research on the music industry has shown, far from 
promoting diversity, some independent companies have been responsible for generating 
extremely formulaic, mass-market content and on terms that are highly unfavourable to 
primary creators (Hesmondhalgh 1997). Therefore, from the point of view of policy-
making as well as scholarship, and at a time when ownership of television production is 
undergoing sweeping changes, a fuller understanding is needed of what the relationship 
may be between corporate ownership and content.   
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Research approach 
The main question this article addresses is: how is content affected when independent 
television production companies are taken over?  Methods of research consisted of 
analysis of content outputs for a sample of leading UK-based production companies over 
an eleven-year period plus interviews with a range of producers and industry experts.  
This article, which seeks to build understanding of the nature of relationship between 
custodianship of a production company and the content it makes, is part of a wider on-
going project2 and involves a multiple case-study based research design.  Research has 
focused on the experience of twelve leading UK-based production companies of differing 
ownership ‘configurations’, i.e. whether independent, or subsidiaries of conglomerates 
(either domestic or international), or vertically integrated entities (part or wholly owned 
by broadcasters) - see table 1.  In this article, particular attention is paid to four 
companies – Keo Films, Left Bank, Love Productions and Mammoth Screen - whose 
content is often seen as, in one way or another, distinctively British.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1: Case-Study Production Companies 
------------------------------------------------- 
In terms of content analysis, all outputs produced by our sample case-study companies 
were tracked, coded and then analysed in order to gauge patterns of continuity and/or 
change over the time period of 2007-2017. Each programme made was analysed 
according to genre classification; who commissioned it; how much of it was produced in 
terms of hours, episodes and series; where and when it was initially transmitted; and its 
wider distribution.  Drawing partly on elements of the design of the ‘cultural test’ which 
applies to UK high-end television (BFI, 2019), content was analysed and coded according 
to its ‘localness’ or ‘globalness’ as measured in terms of setting; location of production; 
regional specificity of the narrative, and makeup of onscreen talent; and ‘above the line’ 
off-screen talent. Content was also coded and analysed according to its market 
performance and critical reception. Market performance was gauged by calculating 
audience ratings for each transmitted programme relative to slot average and by assessing 
the wider territorial reach achieved through secondary distribution of that output. Critical 
performance was measured on the basis of a range of proxies including award 
nominations and wins plus reviews, based on printed press and online review 
aggregators.  
Findings from the analysis of content were combined with evidence from interviews 
carried out with senior executives at the twelve case study production companies and, as 
appropriate, with their parent companies and with corporate financiers specializing in 
takeovers in the television industry.  Interviewees at the above-mentioned production 
companies included Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with responsibility for overall 
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strategy, Chief Creative Officers (CCOs) with frontline responsibility for developing and 
producing content, and also directors of legal and business affairs. This particular 
selection of companies and spread of interviewees has facilitated extensive evidence-
gathering on the core question of how changes in ownership effect content.  Although 
mainly London-based, case studies include entities whose profile and activities extend 
across many international territories.  This is apt since, at a time of increasingly 
globalized restructurings of ownership across the television industry, questions about 
how consolidation and takeovers of independent production companies affect content are 
clearly of wide international relevance.  
In the sections that follow, this article first considers earlier research on questions around 
media ownership, control and content in media; then it presents and analyses original 
evidence from our research into the relationship between corporate ownership and 
content; and then finally it offers concluding reflections on whether and how, in terms of 
its implications for content, industrial re-configuration in the television production 
matters. Against a background of increased investment interest from multi-nationals in 
indigenous players in the UK and across Europe, the analysis presented aims to make a 
timely and policy-relevant contribution to knowledge.  
Ownership, Control and Content  
Research in the realm of media political economy has rightly drawn critical attention to 
concerns about the rise of large, diversified and transnational media organisations and 
concerns about potential for abuses of power (Bagdikian, 2014; Herman and McChesney, 
1997; Hesmondhalgh, 2019; Tunstall and Palmer, 1991). Writers such as Baker (2006) 
have underlined the role of diverse ownership of media in sustaining democracy.  Implicit 
in such work is the assumption of a causal connection between, on one hand, 
concentrations of ownership and, on the other, the nature of media content available to 
audiences.  Measures to secure diverse ownership of media, such as constraints and upper 
limits on ownership, are a widespread feature of media regulation and predicated on the 
general assumption that concentrations of ownership are harmful, because ownership is 
associated with control over content and ideas that influence audiences (Klimkiewicz, 
2005).  Despite transition to the digital era, concerns remain about the power wielded by 
dominant media organisations in relation to production and circulation of news, ideas and 
cultural and political values within contemporary societies (Doyle, 2015). But measuring 
concentrated media ownership or indeed its affects on content and public opinions are 
notoriously difficult (Iosifidis, 2010; DCMS, 2013).   
Some earlier work has underlined the complexity of the relationship between ownership 
and control (Doyle, 2002; Baker 2006; Hesmondhalgh, 2019). Complexity exists partly 
because many issues other than ownership can have a bearing on content produced by a 
media company. The extent to which ownership actually translates into influence over 
content depends on the impact of other inter-related determining factors including the 
ideological and commercial motivations of individual owners. But because the ways and 
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means for a determined owner to shape the content of a media company that s/he owns 
(e.g. through key appointments, control over resources, etc) are so extensive and varied 
(Doyle, 2002), curbs on ownership remain at the forefront of regulatory efforts to 
preserve plurality and diversity of content.  
Research that tests the connections between ownership and content empirically is 
surprisingly limited.  Such studies as have emerged in recent years based on empirical 
analyses of content have tended to focus primarily on news provision and many have 
rightly highlighted the dangers posed for plurality and democracy by homogenisation of 
news content (Doyle, 2015; Fenton, 2010; Lund, Willig and Blach-Ørsten (2009). In 
terms of the television production sector, the issue of how custodianship affects content 
sits of the heart of much recent research – as Esser argues, ‘there can be no doubt that 
ownership matters’ (Esser, 2016: 3609).  But earlier content analysis that seeks to 
examine or demonstrate the effect of changes in ownership on television content-making 
is virtually non-existent.  
The main concern for public policy surrounding patterns of media ownership stems from 
the fact that excessive concentrations of media ownership can lead to over-representation 
of certain political viewpoints or values or certain forms of cultural output at the expense 
of others. But, as earlier work in the tradition of media industrial organisation has argued, 
ownership patterns are important also because they impact on the economics and 
financial performance of industry (Doyle, 2002; Noam, 2011). Restrictions on ownership 
that have been instigated in order to promote pluralism, could, for example, at the same 
time result in duplication of resources or in asymmetries of knowledge which are 
wasteful and prevent industry from capitalising on all cost-efficiencies that are potentially 
available.  
In examining the effects of ownership on content, this research builds partly on earlier 
studies that have examined creativity within media organisations and the relationship 
with autonomy (Amabile et al, 1996; Bennett and Strange, 2014; Bilton and Cummings, 
2014; Georgiades, 2015) and, similarly, work on cultural industries where, as noted by 
Hesmondhalgh (2019), levels of control reflect not only ethical but also economic 
priorities.  This article also extends earlier work which concerns itself broadly with inter-
relations between ownership, business performance and content in the television 
production sector (Chalaby, 2010; Doyle, 2018; Esser, 2016).   
Managerial theory suggests that, in general, differing ownership arrangements will affect 
the day-to-day activities and outputs of firms and, indeed, the additional value which may 
be unleashed by ousting incompetent executives and replacing them with more effective 
senior managers is one of the standard incentives which motivates corporate takeovers 
(Jensen, 1988; Parrino and Harris, 1999).   However, a particular focus in this article is to 
what extent the special contingencies of the television production sector, where success is 
strongly associated with the skills and capabilities of individual creative leaders, may 
disrupt this logic. 
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Corporate configuration and content: the evidence  
In order to investigate the relationship between corporate ownership and content, we 
analysed the content of twelve production companies from 2007-2017 a majority of 
which were acquired during this period – see table 1 above - so we were able to study 
their content both before and after takeover. Three companies remained independent 
throughout the study period.  A key finding which emerges is that when independent 
television production companies are taken over, this does not automatically or 
immediately disrupt or change the sort of content that the company is making.  Despite 
suppositions that takeovers tend to have an adverse effect on creativity and content, 
results of extensive analysis of content data suggest little evidence that takeovers have 
any immediate, significant or sustained affect, individually or by group category, on such 
key attributes of content as its ‘Britishness’, or its ratings and popularity, or its 
performance in terms of awards and critical acclaim.  
This is corroborated by findings from interviews albeit that testimony from industry 
practitioners and financial experts makes it clear that corporate ownership configurations 
can, in some cases at least, also have a determining effect on such aspects of the business 
as levels of market knowledge which, in turn, will affect content decision-making.  So, 
the relationship between corporate ownership and content outputs in the television 
production sector is complex and somewhat multi-faceted.  Being bought up can have 
positive or negative effects for production companies but very often there are few if any 
direct implications for content, according to the views of a range of producers, parent 
companies and independent financiers who have specialized in advising on M&A 
(merger and acquisition) activity in the television production sector. 
Creative and Business Leadership 
The relationship between ownership and content is complex partly because the sort of 
content that a company makes is generally shaped by factors other than ownership, such 
as market demand or producers’ perceptions about what commissioning broadcasters and 
other television service providers are interested in at present.  One strong determinant of 
an independent production company’s output is the guiding vision of the firm’s 
leadership, often its founders.  Outputs will reflect the ambitions of its leadership both in 
respect of creative content-making and development of the business.  Our research has 
found that takeovers often have little or no effect on content outputs because, where 
television production is concerned, a key priority following acquisition will be to ensure 
continuity in the firm’s creative leadership so as to maintain its creative brand, identity 
and value. According to Sachin Dosani, a corporate financier who has been active in 
overseeing and advising on numerous acquisitions of television production companies, 
investors recognize that this is a ‘people business’ in which individual talents and 
capabilities are key to sustaining the value of the enterprise (Dosani, Interview, London, 
January 2019).  Thomas Dey, another experienced corporate financier, confirms that, 
whereas in many sectors of the economy, takeover is often followed by replacement of 
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senior management, acquisition deals in the television production sector are deliberately 
structured in such a way as ensures that creative leaders are ‘financially incentivised’ to 
remain within and grow the company for a period of time after acquisition, usually 4-6 
years (Dey, Interview, Edin/ LA, June 2018).  
Continuity of creative leadership militates against disruption to content.  Even so, the 
general attitude of differing parent companies towards integrating, shaping and 
controlling the activities of newly acquired production subsidiaries varies across the 
sector.  One or two parent companies are seen, as one executive (Interviewee C2, 
London, May 2018) put it, as ‘real aggregators’ and prone to exerting excessive 
centralized control in ways that alienate staff.  However, efforts to centralize and 
streamline are generally focused on back office and support functions (as opposed to core 
programme-making) where improvements in cost-efficiency can be achieved without 
detriment to content.  Overall, the consensus view amongst our interviewees is that, for 
the vast majority of production companies who are taken over, whether by a domestic or 
by a foreign conglomerate, this has not resulted in any efforts to directly interfere in 
creative processes. 
Vertical Integration 
While evidence of direct interference is scant, changes in ownership can more broadly 
affect the sort of content that a production company makes and a key determinant of 
whether they do so or not is what effect they have on the vertical structure of the 
combined entity (production company plus parent). When a production company is 
bought up, if the investment has come from a broadcaster then, consistent with the 
recognized and long-standing strategic benefits of vertical integration between production 
and dissemination (Lotz, 2017), this may facilitate more or at least a steady flow of 
commissions for new productions from the parent company.  Mammoth Screen, maker of 
dramas including Poldark (BBC), Parade’s End (BBC) and Endeavour (ITV), is one of 
several television production companies acquired by ITV, the oldest and largest 
commercial television network in the UK, over recent years.  The advantages of vertical 
cross-ownership for Mammoth may be inferred from analysis of data about the 
company’s first run output over time which, as Figure 1 shows, has been heavily, 
although not exclusively, favoured by commissions from ITV. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1: Mammoth Screen First Run Output by Commissioner 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Some broadcasters, in setting out to acquire independent production companies, are 
strongly motivated by a desire for greater control over supplies of content, not only in 
order to service the needs of their own channels but also in order to keep that content 
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away from rivals. Kevin Lygo, Director of Television at ITV, highlights the advantages 
for a broadcasters of cross-owning production subsidiaries both in the shape of additional 
revenues from exploitation of IPRs and also through acquiring greater strategic control 
over a pipeline of attractive content: 
the way we looked at it was, in a perfect world …you want to own the content that 
you’re commissioning. And from the moment you commission this programme 
through to the end of its life you want to be continuing to earn off that intellectual 
property…   
And for the parent company ITV, almost as important as the money – though 
probably not as important – is the control that you have over it. So the broadcaster 
can say, “Right, I don’t want this appearing on another channel for x years.”  
Whereas if you’re dealing with an independent, that’s a negotiation. 
(Lygo, Interview, London, December 2018) 
Strategic ownership of rights has become very important in the era of SVoDs such as 
Netflix. As Lygo acknowledges, until recently broadcasters such as ITV were happy to 
sell large quantities of older programming material to SVoD services such as Amazon 
and Netflix who would ‘hoover up libraries’ (Lygo, Interview, London, December 2018).  
But with leading SVoD services increasingly perceived as posing a threat to the core 
business of broadcasters, and with broadcasters themselves now setting up their own 
subscription-based streaming services, this has brought a change in strategic approach 
and a reluctance to sell back catalogue material.  In short, broadcasters have realized that 
‘…we were feeding them [Netflix and Amazon] our lunch!’ (Lygo, Interview, London, 
December 2018). 
The rationale underlying upstream vertical expansion into production can vary from one 
broadcast organisation to another.  Whereas ITV’s strategy of acquiring independent 
production companies has been driven at least partly by a wish to diversify revenues and 
underpin the competitive position of its broadcast channels, for UK pay-TV broadcaster 
Sky, the primary impetus has been to strengthen its international distribution business, 
Sky Vision. Jane Millichip who, since assuming her current role as Managing Director at 
Sky Vision in 2013, has led a series of acquisitions of television production companies 
explains that whereas Sky’s pay-TV channels had historically relied on ‘rented’ US-made 
content, a move towards more investment in origination of content meant it became 
‘strategically sensible’ to develop a complementary business model based on ownership 
and exploitation of television content rights (Millichip, Interview, London, December 
2018). Investment in a number of IPR-generating production companies such as Love 
Productions and Blast Films has enabled Sky to build the successful development of its 
international distribution business.  
Pursuit of the advantages to be had from vertical cross-ownership of IPR-generating 
production companies plus international content distribution businesses is also frequently 
the rationale underlying strategies of acquisition by consolidated ‘super-indies’, ‘hyper-
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indies’ and other media groups, both domestic and international.  Many senior executives 
who have worked at acquisitive production entities, such as Endemol Shine and 
All3Media, point to how a strategy of takeovers helps to diversify the business and 
support distribution.  As Jane Turton, CEO of All3Media puts it, building scale through 
acquisition ‘is about risk management spread over a broader portfolio of people and 
programmes’ and about building and ‘replenish[ing] the IP catalogue’ which feeds 
through to the international distribution business (Turton, Interview, London, July 2018). 
 
Informational Advantages and Addressing Uncertainty 
 
If the buyer of a production company already possesses a distribution business then, from 
the perspective of acquired production subsidiary, vertical cross-ownership may well 
confer important informational advantages. Being part of a larger media group is likely to 
bring the production subsidiary valuable market intelligence about what sort of content is 
in development and in demand across the globe. Tim Hincks, now CEO of Expectation 
Entertainment, explains how, as part of his former role as Chief Executive of Endemol 
UK, participation in regular meetings of the Group’s global creative team facilitated 
informational exchanges:  
It was a place to share [ideas, and] where I could come back from as the UK and 
say to the BBC, for the sake of argument, “There’s a really interesting show being 
developed in Italy, you should have a look at it and I’ll show you it.  
(Hincks, Interview, London, July 2018) 
Another possible form of informational advantage for subsidiaries of larger groups is 
improved understanding about the going rates for certain forms of content.  SVoD 
services such as Netflix and Amazon are often criticized for their unwillingness to share 
data with producers or others about audiences and about prices paid for content 
(Interviewee C11, London, November 2018). So the insights that an experienced parent 
company can impart to a production subsidiary, for example about pricing, can help in 
negotiating a fair deal for content.  Debbie Manners, Consultant at the Ingenious Group 
and former CEO at ‘true independent’ production company Keo Films, concedes that 
securing a well-informed grasp on such matters can be more challenging for indies than 
for competitors who are part of sizeable, well-connected companies that have high status 
in the creative environment (Manners, Interview, London, October 2018). Informational 
asymmetries are clearly of pertinence too to the question of how ownership affects 
content in that the profile of content created by producers that are owned by bigger 
groups, as opposed to indies, is likely to be shaped by superior market knowledge. 
For Sachin Dosani, the main potential sources of advantage for companies that are taken 
over are new informational insights, better access to distribution and improved access to 
financing for development and production, the latter being especially important for 
smaller production companies (Dosani, Interview, London, January 2019).  The view 
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that, in a business environment characterised by uncertainty, producers benefit from the 
financial security of having a well-resourced parent and this helps with making more 
ambitious content is broadly corroborated by producers. According to Charlie Goldberg, 
Senior Business and Legal Affairs Manager at drama producer Left Bank Pictures, when 
‘you have the backing of a large corporation that gives you a bit more clout [and] 
security.  It gives you the ability to run at some big projects without too much concern’ 
(Goldberg, Interview, London, November 2018).  For Hincks, being part of a larger 
group typically helps by:   
providing a cushion, because ultimately you’re not looking at survival on a daily 
basis…  [and] you might get some leverage through existing relationships …You 
will get more investment and be able to take more risks in your ideas.  
(Hincks, Interview, London, July 2018)   
  
 
Acquisitions and Adversity 
 
But acquisition can result in adversities for a production company that have implications 
for its content. Andy Harries, Chief Executive of Left Bank Productions has spoken of 
being ‘a bit frozen out by the BBC and ITV’ in the period immediately following 
acquisition by Sony (Harries cited in Clarke, 2017).  Resentments are unlikely to be a 
major or sustained problem. However, acquired companies are subject to oversight by 
new owners and, for some producers, the disciplines involved in being accountable may 
impact on motivation, as Kevin Lygo explains: 
I think the evidence would be that when you give someone £10m and you say, 
“You now work for me”, then you don’t get the best out of them and they feel a bit 
less motivated, a bit less special… I don’t think there is some weird corporate 
thing that happens sort of, “You can’t do this, you can’t do that”. But there is 
something psychological that happens to these entrepreneurial individualist 
creative people who thought they were masters of their universe and now have to 
report to someone…Now it’s like, “Right, we want the accounts on April the 3rd”.  
(Lygo, Interview, London, December 2018) 
 
Acquired television production companies are confronted with pressures that previously 
had not existed to produce high financial returns.  The knock-on effects of this can vary.  
Charlie Goldberg observes that operating ‘under corporate scrutiny’ and under pressure 
to produce returns means that an acquired drama producer, unlike a smaller independent 
company which can be flexible on margins, will find it very ‘challenging’ to produce 
content at prevailing UK broadcaster tariff (£’000 per hour) rates (Goldberg, Interview, 
London, November 2018).   For Debbie Manners, it is inevitable that accountability to a 
parent company changes the modus operandi of an acquired production company:  
all [acquired] companies will have clear profit targets and all of that in a way that 
they won’t have had as a pure independent… And I think as soon as you have got 
an annual target that you’re accountable to someone else for, you have got to think 
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long and hard about what the easiest way or the most efficient way of delivering 
that is.  
(Manners, Interview, London, October 2018) 
 
That takeover involves greater oversight and accountability in terms of business 
performance is widely acknowledged. Even so, few if any producers who have 
experienced takeover, either as the acquirer or the acquired, believe that curtailment to 
creative freedom or other adverse implications for content are a necessary corollary.  The 
consensus viewpoint on this is encapsulated by Tim Hincks who believes that concerns 
that ownership impacts negatively on the creative pipeline have been overstated: 
I mean yes, a shareholder will of course look at the numbers and look at the 
performance. But the leap from that to “are we making the right shows?” is quite a 
big leap. 
(Hincks, Interview, London, July 2018) 
 
An interesting and unexpected finding of our research is that takeovers in the production 
sector have been driven as much by the interests of sellers as buyers.  Although the 
narrative implied by such headlines as ‘British indie TV producers a victim of own 
success as foreign owners swoop’ (Sweney, 2014) is one of victimhood, many 
independent producers are in fact very keenly interested in developing their companies to 
the point where they may attract the interest of investors.   That production companies 
actively prepare for and embrace acquisition is reflected in a pattern, commonly 
discernible amongst production companies that have been taken over– for example Left 
Bank in which Sony Pictures Television International acquired a 51% stake in 2012 
(figure 2 below) - of growth in turnover and output in the years leading up to acquisition 
followed by a brief dip in performance immediately afterwards before recovery in 
growth.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 2: Left Bank Turnover and Total Hours Transmitted 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The consensus viewpoint amongst our interviewees is that many producers regard 
developing a profile that increases the prospect of interest from investors as desirable 
because of the perceived benefits of takeover which include a range of possible 
advantages for the business and also, usually, a substantial windfall for founding owners. 
As Charlie Goldberg explains: 
I think there generally has been a mindset amongst people who set up independent 
production companies that the idea is to get it to a point where it can be sold.  That 
is the standard path … because the alternative is that you’re setting up an ongoing 
lifestyle business [but] in this industry people start to reach a point in their careers 
13 
 
where it’s no longer sustainable. It’s quite a demanding career, to run a company 
like this. [M]ost execs …their view is, in 5 or 6 or 7 years whatever then they’ll 
sell.  
(Goldberg, Interview, London, November 2018) 
 
Given that takeover is an outcome many producers embrace enthusiastically, it is 
unsurprising that so few ‘true independents’ of significant scale populate the UK 
production ecosystem. Hartswood Films (maker of Sherlock (BBC)) and Hat Trick are 
among a shrinking constituency of large, commercially successful companies that remain 
fully independent. That most have been taken over is as much a reflection of ambitious 
producers who want to cash in and procure the benefits of takeover, as it is strategic 
predation on the part of larger media groups or broadcasters.   As far as implications for 
content are concerned, the key point is that, as leading corporate financier Thomas Dey 
points out, independent production companies who become targets for takeover generally 
do so on the strength of having already achieved a proven and sustained track record of 
commitment to and success in implementing content strategies that conduce to 
commercial success (Dey, Interview, Edin/ LA, June 2018).   Indies that appeal to 
investors have already embarked on commercially-minded content strategies prior to 
takeover, such as focusing on material that appeals to international markets and on 
‘returners’ or programmes that re-commissioned and long-running series. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3: Mammoth Screen Turnover and Total Hours Transmitted 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
For example, Mammoth Screen exhibited a positive pattern of business growth in the run-
up to being fully bought out by ITV in 2015, built upon success in making such re-
commissioned series as Poldark (BBC) and Endeavour (ITV) see Figure 3. Mammoth’s 
appeal as an investment accords with Thomas Dey’s analysis of the key attributes that 
prospective buyers of independent production companies are interested in: a strong 
business profile; a good strategic fit to that investor’s aspirations and, above all, a track 
record of making compelling programmes that are ‘returners’ or re-commissioned: 
Number one is what kind of programmes are you producing… A buyer wants to 
see that you’ve got, two or three different programmes that have gone to season 
three and maybe even are a bit longer.  So a layered approach of programmes that 
are enduring, have life and have continued success.  
(Dey, Interview, Edin/ LA, June 2018) 
 
Debbie Manners, former CEO at Keo Films and former MD at Hat Trick Productions, 
agrees that getting one or more returning series is vital to the business prospects (and, by 
implication, the investment appeal) of any production company not only because having 
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a greater number of episodes of a show ‘makes a massive difference to marketability’ but 
also because it makes production more cost-effective. According to Manners:   
As soon as you’ve got something that comes back every year …that’s covering 
your basic overhead usually … you can breathe a slight sigh of relief and think 
about what else you want to do around it and be more creative. …Doing lots of 
…one-offs is just as much hard work as a returning series and it delivers a fraction 
of the returns.   
(Manners, Interview, London, October 2018) 
 
Returners are the stock in trade of a commercially successful production company and 
this holds true not just for drama but for all genres of output. This is reflected in the 
performance of factual entertainment producer Love Productions which achieved several 
re-commissions of its flagship show The Great British Bakeoff (BBC) in the period 
leading up to when Sky acquiring a 70% stake in the company in 2014 – see Figure 4. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4: Love Productions Turnover and Total Hours Transmitted 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
However, making Bakeoff for the BBC became problematic because of disputes related to 
format infringement which caused distrust on the producer’s part in the Corporation’s 
behaviour and because of challenges surrounding re-negotiation of tariffs paid for the 
show (Addley, 2016). The public furore which surrounded Love’s decision in 2016 to 
switch to making future episodes of Bakeoff for a rival broadcaster demonstrated the 
potential for brands that audiences regard as having ‘national treasure’ status to confer on 
their owners the mixed blessing of potentially high rewards but also high risk of 
opprobrium should management of the property be seen as prioritizing commercial goals.   
Yet, however uncomfortably juxtaposed with notions of creativity founded around artistic 
integrity and public good, it is notable that promoting ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ is 
strongly inscribed as an objective for contemporary creative industries policy-making 
(Bazalgette, 2017: 16). As our research indicates, successful entrepreneurship has been a 
major driving force behind recent transformations in ownership in the production sector.  
Many independent producers, prior to takeover, have already embarked on content 
strategies that are primarily geared towards commercial success and growth. And content 
is largely unaffected by takeover because no self-interested investor will want to interfere 
with the creative mechanisms through which, under circumstances of autonomy, an 
earlier track record of business growth has been successfully accomplished.  
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Conclusion: After the Gold Rush 
A confluence of circumstances accounts for the rise, particularly in the UK, of M&A 
activity in the television production sector over recent years. A growing proliferation of 
digital distribution platforms for television including globalized SVoD services has 
created additional demand for content, both domestically and internationally, providing 
abundant creative and commercial opportunities for ambitious television producers 
around the world.  At the same time, helped along by public policy interventions which, 
since 2004, have ensured that UK producers retain high levels of ownership of IP, the UK 
production sector has been exceptionally well placed to cater to and prosper from these 
opportunities. However, in line with strains that some see as endemic to processes of 
media globalisation, ensuing restructurings in ownership of television production have 
been characterised by tensions and contradictions, for example, between celebrating the 
success of the sector in international markets versus preserving the integrity of local 
content-making, between private gain versus public good, and between corporatized or 
foreign ownership versus creative autonomy.  
It is widely assumed that consolidation and takeovers of indigenous and independent 
television production companies by large groups and, especially, by US or other foreign 
multinationals are detrimental to content – for example, by stifling creativity (Abraham, 
2014).  However, drawing on extensive content analysis and on the testimony of a range 
of producers, parent companies and independent financiers who have specialized in 
advising on M&A activity in the television production sector, a major finding of this 
study is that most takeovers have few if any immediate or significant adverse affects on 
the creative processes or the content made by television production companies. Findings 
presented here are based on a limited sample group of London-based production 
companies and over a limited time period.  Even so, that, for many television producers, 
changes in ownership are generally not seen as detrimental to content-making is a 
conclusion that has potentially significant implications. 
This article argues that while takeovers may have positive or negative effects for 
production companies, very often the implications for content are negligible. Although at 
odds with general perceptions that ownership by large conglomerates entails harmful 
consequences for cultural production, our finding that takeovers have little disruptive 
effects on content strategies is explained by three inter-related factors.  
First, in an industrial sector where demand is governed by the law of ‘nobody knows’ 
(Caves, 2000:3), the main reason why a production company will be of interest to 
investors is because it has already managed to achieve a sustained track record of making 
content that is commercially successful. Acquisitive larger players reduce their own risks 
by targeting independents who, by dint of their content-making and IP exploitation 
strategies, have demonstrated potential for business success.  
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Second, similarly, in a highly uncertain market environment many (although by no means 
not all) independent producers actively seek takeover because this offers a means of 
realising commercial ambitions which otherwise, as an indie, would be less easy to attain. 
It is widely recognised that takeover can bring advantages for the business as well as 
personal windfalls for founding owners. And, as Douglas Wood, Director of Research 
and Insight at Endemol Shine points out, ‘most producers do want people to watch their 
shows and do want to have large audiences’ (Wood, Interview, London, June 2018).  
Finally, in line with earlier theorization which underlines the links between leadership, 
strategy and success in media industries (Küng, 2017), television production is a sector 
where individual leaders are seen as playing a vital role in company success. Investors in 
television production companies tend to insist on continuity of leadership as a means of 
preserving the value of acquisitions and so, for those independent companies which are 
taken over, this provides a natural insulation against top-down interference in creative 
content-making.   
Viewed in totality, these factors support the conclusion that, for television production 
companies, changes in custodianship are unlikely to impact negatively on content. 
However, even if takeovers don’t bring direct interference in content strategies, it remains 
that more generalised, indirect and longer-term effects are possible. The wider 
relationship between media ownership and content is complicated and a full analysis is 
beyond the scope of this article.  But likely areas for concern stemming from 
restructurings of ownership that deserve further research include the effects of takeover 
on creative leadership and outputs following more extended times lags, and also the 
potential for consolidated ownership to give rise to anti-competitive effects and market 
failures, such as those stemming from asymmetries of market power. 
Despite processes of consolidation and the acquisition of many large UK producers by 
global media corporations, it is notable that the majority of television production 
companies in the UK are still small independent entities.   As a recent review of the 
independent production sector carried out by Ofcom concluded, ‘there remains a diverse 
and vibrant SME production sector and the system continues to promote very high levels 
of market entry’ (Ofcom, 2015: 6).  Likewise, an annual census of the sector 
commissioned by UK trade association for producers PACT also confirms that renewal is 
ongoing through the arrival of new production start-ups and through smaller companies 
developing and growing their businesses (Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2018). Public policy – in 
particular the terms of trade - has helped to set the conditions whereby such vigorous 
industrial renewal is possible. As Sachin Dosani observes:  
For every Love Productions, there are many more independent production 
companies that have been formed that have not been sold, and many of which will 
never be sold. Those indies have been setup and have survived, creating new 
employment etc because of the terms of trade that exist in the UK. 
(Dosani, Interview, London, January 2019) 
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How well this can be sustained as the television environment evolves and as 
commissioning power shifts from broadcasters to globalised SVoD platforms who are 
‘pushing us back into the world [of the] cost plus model’ (Goldberg, Interview, London, 
November 2018) is open to question. Nonetheless, the experience of the UK television 
production sector demonstrates that, despite challenges posed by internationalisation of 
flows of content and of global investment capital, policy interventions at national level 
can be decisive in supporting the performance of local players.  Despite globalisation, 
national policy-making remains pivotal to the economic viability of indigenous cultural 
production industries and content. 
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                                                1	A ‘qualifying indie’ (QI) is a production company in which a broadcaster holds a minority share of less 
than 25.1%. Commissioning quotas require PSBs to commission a proportion of their output from Indies 
or Qualifying Indies The definition of a QI has changed over time, increasing initially from 15% 
maximum ownership share. Indeed, a company that is majority owned by a foreign broadcaster can now 
be classified as qualifying independent (Lee 2018: 177). 
 
2 ‘Television Production in Transition: Independence, Scale and Sustainability’ (TPIT) is a three-year 
study funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ES/N015258/1). 
 
Graphs and Tables (all self-originated):  
Company	 Founded	
Configuration	
(parent;	year	of	takeover)	
Key	Outputs	
Hartswood	Films	 1979	 Independent	(n/a)	 Lady	Chatterley’s	Lover,	Sherlock	
Hat	Trick	 1986	 Independent	(n/a)	 Boomers,	Episodes,	Have	I	Got	News	
for	You?	Keo	Films	 1996	 Independent	(n/a)	 Hugh’s	Fish	Fight,	Skint,	River	
Cottage	Firecracker	 2002	 Conglomerate	(Tinopolis;	2012)	 Dr	Christian	Will	See	You	Now,	My	Big	Fat	Gypsy	Wedding,	Kudos	 2002	 Conglomerate	(Endemol	Shine;	2006)	 Hustle,	Law	&	Order	UK,	Spooks	Left	Bank	 2007	 Conglomerate	(Sony;	2012)	 The	Crown,	Outlander,	Strike	Back	Lion	 1997	 Conglomerate	(All3Media;	2004)	 Horrible	Histories,	Homes	Under	the	Hammer	Blast!	Films	 1994	 Vertically	Integrated	(Sky;	2015)	 999	What’s	Your	Emergency,	The	Supervet	Love	Productions	 2004	 Vertically	Integrated	(Sky;	2014)	 Benefits	Street,	Great	British	Bake	Off,	Great	British	Sewing	Bee	Mammoth	Screen	 2006	 Vertically	Integrated	(ITV;	2015)	 And	Then	There	Were	None,	Endeavour,	Poldark	Pulse	Films	 2004	 Vertically	Integrated	(Vice	Media;	2016)	 Pillow	Talk,	Pineapple	Dance	Studios	Red	Production	Co	 1997	 Vertically	Integrated	(Studio	Canal;	2013)	 Last	Tango	in	Halifax,	Ordinary	Lies,	Scott	&	Bailey	
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Figure 4: Love Productions Turnover and Total Hours Transmitted 
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